youth subcultures, and so forth, to an emergent arena for re-defining Japan and its post-imagined communities. Put differently, since the 1990s, popular cultures have become the strategic site where renegotiation of the significance attributed to the past, present, and future of the nation as well as its socialization are articulated through the fluid intersection of hegemonic trajectories from "above" and "below," both of which are disseminated across the proliferating circuits of the Japanese "media mix":
The "media mix" is a term that refers to the media environment whereby a particular franchise releases interconnecting products for a wide range of media "platforms"-animation, comics, video games, theatrical films, soundtracks-and commodity types-cell-phone straps, T-shirts, bags, figurines, and so on. It is a state of what we might call the "serial inter-connection of commodities"-wherein commodities (including media types) do not stand alone as products but interrelate, generally through the existence of a principal character or narrative. (Steinberg 2009: 191) Based on a fieldwork conducted on the multimedia platform originated by the webmanga Axis Powers Hetalia (2006-) and its fandom, where nations and world history are personified as cute boys, in this chapter I explore the complex mobilization of emotions, pleasures, and desires reconfiguring relations between history, nation, and youth. Particular attention will be given to emergent hegemonic articulations from "below" stimulating so-called moe affect: an ambiguous neologism difficult to define, but which under the sign of light-hearted parody, polymorphous pleasure, and cross-gendered sexuality has become in the last decade a dominant paradigm among more or less subcultural young prosumers, both male-oriented otaku (fans of manga, anime, video games, etc.) and female-oriented fujoshi (litt. "rotten women, girls"; fans of male-to-male homosexual fantasies).
POP NATIONALISM "FROM ABOVE": COOL JAPAN
Institutionalized pop nationalism is strongly shaped by recent governmental policies aimed at promoting cultural or creative industries under the umbrella term of "Cool Japan": a slogan influenced by the concept of "Japan's Gross National Cool," as first formulated in an article published on Foreign Policy in 2002. The author, Douglas McGray, suggested "Pilgrimages to Sacred Sites" that were featured in manga, anime, video games, or television dramas (JETRO 2005 (JETRO , 2015 , from the national television channel NHK broadcasting since 2006 more than 100 episodes of the series "Cool Japan. Hakkutsu kakkōii Nippon," to the kind of pop diplomacy inaugurated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs's nominating the atomic-powered cat character Doraemon as "Anime Ambassador of Japan" (2008) and three fashion trendsetting girl as "Ambassadors of kawaii (cute)" (2009) to be paraded in Japanese diplomatic and cultural institutions across the world (Daliot-Bul 2009; Iwabuchi 2008) .
Regardless of the effectiveness offered by this kind of nation branding in terms of increased international competitiveness for the cultural industry or of increased soft power for the state, what is of particular interest for the purposes of this chapter is the fact that a strategic alliance is taking place under the slogan of "Cool Japan" between neo-conservative and neo-liberal forces. This has contributed in the last decade to a nationwide rhetoric on popular and youth cultures, mobilizing politics, bureaucracy, industry, and mass media, in order to improve the nation's image on the international arena, to revitalize a stagnating economy and to find again pride in its own culture.
POP NATIONALISM "FROM BELOW": J-CULTURE AND YOUTH PANIC
While "Cool Japan" is a concept mainly deployed in institutional discourse, I describe as "pop nationalism from below" the cultural strategies more directly related to the younger generations and how they experience the nation. I use the concept to reflect on how Japan as an "imagined community" is being re-produced among those who have been acculturated and socialized within the transmedial constellation of J-culture. Whereas Cool Japan is an institutional response to the post-ideological instability and traumatic economic slowdown induced by the end of the Cold War and the post-bubble stagnation, pop nationalism from below stems from internal changes, in particular in the sociocultural spheres.
On the one hand, we see the crisis of the "Japan, Inc." model (kigyōshakai) nurtured by the rapid post-war economic growth and prosperity, and the consequent decline of the idea of a corporate nation, symbolized by the social icons of the "white collar worker" (sararīman) and the "full-time housewife" (sengyōshufu), working in concert to form the basis of the collective myth of "one hundred million middle class" (ichioku sōchūryū) of a homogenous nation. On the other hand, we see the intensification of neo-liberal capitalism shaped by information technology, advanced consumerism, and ludic entertainment, where the increasing impoverishment of the middle classes and precarization of the labour market have introduced the idea of an "unequal society" (kakusa shakai) (Yoda and Harootunian 2006) .
Within this scenario, the new generations who appear no longer willing to contribute actively to the social reproduction anchored on the modern paradigms of study, work, and family, have become the centre of public preoccupation and alarmed discussions. The sources of this public concern range from young people who avoid social interaction and seclude themselves in their private rooms (hikikomori) to students refusing to go to school (futōkō), young adults, particularly women, who postpone marriage and continue to live in their parents' home (parasite single); masculinizing "carnivore women" who are assertively independent, dedicated to work, and reject marriage and motherhood; feminized "herbivore men" who are passive, don't invest on their career, and don't seek a partner to marry; "free young workers" who seem to prefer self-realization to stable employment (freeter); and young people who are "not in education, employment, or training" (NEET), to name but the most significant.
Japanese mass media have fabricated in the last two decades an endless list of such negative stereotypes, contributing to the social construction of the alarming, disturbing, or simply weird nature of Japanese youth, which was subsequently amplified by international journalism and scholarship. However, it can be argued that this public rhetoric, rather than documenting a concrete shift towards asociality of the new generations, represents instead a kind of social panic; it reveals the growing anxiety of adult society about its future, which is further enhanced by their reliance on obsolete categories in order to make sense of these ongoing transformations (Goodman et al. 2012) .
It is in this wider context that the more specific intersection between national identity, youth, and history is being negotiated and reconfigured. On the institutional side, neo-conservative forces are intensifying their efforts towards a more nationalistic and patriotic turn, including proposals for revision of article 9, the "peace article" of the Japanese Constitution, participation of the so-called "Self Defence forces" in international peacekeeping missions, visits to the Yasukuni shrine by prime ministers and diet cabinet members to commemorate Second World War soldiers, including A-class war criminals, and new moral and patriotic guidelines for public education, such as the formal recognition in 1999 of the national anthem Kimi ga yo and the Hi no Maru national flag to be celebrated in public schools, or the adoption of "patriotic" textbooks such as Kokoro no nōto (Notes for the Heart) for primary and junior high school students promoted by the Ministry of Education (MEXT) in 2002 (Rose 2006) .
In addition, revisionist or negationist discourses on the nation's modern history have intensified, especially in order to revise collective perceptions of the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial forces following the invasion or occupation of neighbouring Asian countries during the Pacific War. Among the most influential is the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reforms (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai) that was able to obtain ministerial approval for its revisionist school textbook in 2002, while more openly xenophobic statements, especially anti-Chinese and anti-Korean ones, have become pervasive through online dissemination on less institutional message boards, like "2channel" or on right-wing websites (netto uyoku), such as "Sakura Channel" (Children and Textbook Japan Network 21 2013).
It comes as no surprise that within these right-wing efforts, national and international public opinion have become particularly sensitive to the growing historical revisionism and negationism, and especially to popular publications such as manga targeting younger audiences. Yoshinori Kobayashi is the author of the manga series Gōmanism Sengen (9 vols., 1995-) , including Sensōron (On War, 3 vols., 1998 -2003 , that ostensibly aims at correcting the "distorted and masochistic vision" of Japanese modern history that Kobayashi argues was fabricated by the US Occupation Forces and Japanese leftists. According to Kobayashi, current historiography is a kind of brainwashing that has been imposed upon the Japanese people by the US-sponsored individualistic values of anti-militaristic pacifism, human rights, equality, and feminism, becoming the main obstacle for the development of patriotism and a healthy nationalism in post-war Japan. His mangaesque revisionism relies on a selected historic documentation, and advocates, among other things, denial of the "fabricated" historiography on the Nanking Massacre or of the forced sexual exploitation of "comfort women"; to contrast this, he urges to re-discover the heroic self-sacrifice of kamikaze and other soldiers condemned by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, such as general Hideki Tōjō, who all fought inspired by their love for their families, nation, and emperor in order to free Asia from racist "white" colonialism. , resulting in anti-immigrant groups rallying in the streets, such as the case of the Zaitokukai (Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi). Yamano's first manga series can be seen as a reaction to the "Korean Wave" (the rise in popularity of South Korean TV fiction and pop music) and to Japan-Korea disputes (Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, Liancourt Rocks, comfort women, etc.), while the second manga addresses Japan-China disputes (anti-Japanese nationalism in China, the Nanking Massacre, Chinese food safety, etc.) (Liscutin 2009 ). Similar to Kobayashi's Gomanism series, Yamano's manga employs a first person narrative to explain to its young audience the "real" historical and political truth of the nation's relationship with Korea and China by resorting to the same revisionist historiography.
Both authors had close relations with the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reforms, Kobayashi even being a founding member in 1996, while Yamano's manga include revisionist essays of its academic affiliates. Both employ the manga in an instrumental way in order to popularize an ideological discourse with assertive and clear revisionist messages, by resorting to some extent to argumentative demonstration. However hard they try to employ the expressive, symbolic, and affective potentiality of the manga as medium, they do not exceed in a significant way other institutionalized political and historical commentary that is still confined by the communicative restraints of modernist, serious, and contents-based nationalism.
Both series represent the most successful examples of revisionist manga, as demonstrated by their good sales: 600,000 copies for Kobayashi's first volume of the Sensōron trilogy and 450,000 copies for Yamano's first volume of Manga Kenkanryū. However, two considerations should be made on those numbers. Firstly, while these sales are high in absolute terms, we must remember that manga bestseller status is usually measured in terms of millions of copies sold for a single volume, and of tenths or even hundreds of millions for a whole series; compared to those figures, neither manga series has been as outstanding a success as media coverage seemed to imply. Secondly, we must remember that the manga have necessarily been purchased exclusively not only by supporters of historical revisionism but also by a large number of students, teachers, intellectuals, and journalists, who were curious or alarmed by its controversial contents. In other words, although the texts do represent the ideological perspectives of its authors and have therefore spurred alarmism in public opinion, the real effectiveness of this kind of mangaesque effort in popularizing historical revisionism among a wider range of the younger audience is questionable.
YOUTH PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM
In this battle to conquer the hearts and minds of the younger generations, are Japanese youth really becoming more patriotic or nationalistic? If we pay attention to empirical findings offered by national surveys in the past two decades, a rather ambivalent picture emerges. According to these reports, from a cross-generational point of view, the average "strong love for the nation" appears to have remained relatively stable, decreasing from 52. Most importantly, besides the slight cross-generational changes and comparatively low level of attachment to one's nation, clearly constant is the gap in patriotic sentiment between older and younger generations. In 2015, the 55.4 % statement of "strong love for the nation" drew an approval rate of 69.6 % rate among the population aged 70 and above, but only 42.3 % among respondents under 29. Similarly, in 2010, 65.4 % of respondents stating to be "proud of being Japanese" was averaged between 74.3 % for respondents over 50 and 54.4 % for respondents under 29. In other words, not only patriotism appears to be inversely proportional to youth, but pride or love for the nation among the younger generation is significantly below the national average. 4 Finally, in order to complete the international perspective, it may be useful to compare survey results on "the willingness to fight for one's own nation." In this case, there is a slight increase in the decade 2000-2010, from 13.4% to 15.2 %; but the 15.2 % of respondents willing to fight for their own nation placed Japan as the most pacifist among 78 countries surveyed, with even greater differences compared to China's 74.2 % and South Korea's 63 %, or the USA's 57.8 % and UK's 55.4 % (World Values Survey 2014).
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It may be therefore useful to stress that the increased media visibility of neo-conservative initiatives by the government and of revisionist or xenophobic manga, movies, blogs, and so forth has not resulted, at least in the past two decades, into a significant increase of patriotism or nationalism among the wider population and, in particular, among the younger generations. To be more specific, if there has been an increase in patriotic pride or broader love for the Japanese nation, this process is not measurable and recognizable through the conventional ideological or political paradigms that have been employed to make sense of the modern "imagined community" of post-war Japan. On the contrary, I argue that most right-wing discourses and practices in contemporary Japan are best interpreted as a defensive reaction in the face of the younger generations who appear to be indifferent or reluctant to identify with a nation-state that offers them much less than what it gave their parents or grandparents. In this perspective, I see institutionalized nationalism and revisionist popular culture as associated with what has been defined as "therapeutic nationalism" (iyashi no nashonarizumu) or "anxious nationalism" (fuangata nashonarizumu), and as an expression of compensatory and defensive efforts in regard to the increasing uncertainty induced by neo-liberal capitalism, global competition, in particular with China and South Korea, flexibility or instability of the domestic labour market, and the transformation of Japan into a more fluid, consumerist, and ludic society (Oguma and Ueno 2003; Takahara 2006) .
Psychiatrist Kayama Rika, one of the most important voices in the recent academic debate about Japanese youth nationalism, described it as a "petit nationalism" (puchi nashonarizumu) or "naïve nationalism" (mujakina nashonarizumu), to distinguish it from the more ostensibly ideological forms of the past. Phenomena like the renewed craze for the national football team, the passionate participation in singing Kimi ga yo, and the proliferation of subcultures interested in national history obviously express a rekindling of concern for something akin to the idea of nation, but in Kayama's view such interest is rather dehistoricized and depoliticized. Others, like sociologist Takahara Motoaki, integrate this interpretation with the concept of "hobbyfied nationalism" (shumika shita nashonarizumu), which they see as produced by a society where more and more young people prefer to define themselves through new media, consumption, and especially their hobbies, rather than through traditional areas of socialization such as study, work, and family. Finally, cultural critic Kitada Akihiro called the phenomenon a "funny nationalism" (warau nashonarizumu), and saw its origin in a kind of "cynical romanticism" (shinikaruna romanshugi), which is born of two seemingly opposite social developments. On the one hand, cynical formalism, ironic detachment, and indifference towards the values and meta-narratives of modernity, which result in an obsession with formal aspects, and a lack of concern for depth, substance, and historical consciousness. On the other hand, an almost romantic emotional strain of intimacy, which leads to a search for close relationship and a need to share with others. The two are complicit in forming an image of the nation that is apparently formal and externalized, but at the same time becomes a simulacrum invested with a high level of affect, which can stimulate new relationships and social networks.
NEW SENSITIVITIES "FROM BELOW": MOE
Within the context of such increasingly publicized, hobbyfied, and ironic acculturation and socialization, great attention has been paid to a distinctive form of emotional investment which appears to be shared by many emerging youth subcultures of the past decade. Moe is a neologism that is difficult to translate; the term itself refers to a strong passion, and is linked to the idea of germinating but also to that of caring for something or somebody. Its contemporary use arose in the 1990s within the subculture of male otaku (fans of video games, manga, anime, etc.), in the Akihabara electronics shops district of Tokyo. It indicates a spontaneous transport, or "burning passion," for Japanese fictional characters that are young, pure, and sexy. The kyara, as these characters are called, are very kawaii (cute, adorable, innocent), but at the same time have clear sexual connotations. Some aspects of their recurring iconography are huge eyes without pupils, soft contours and disproportionate heads, pale skin, cat ears, maid uniforms, sweet voices, and innocent personality.
These elements can be split, recomposed, and multiplied in the transmedia galaxy of manga, anime, video games, and toys, to reconfigure new kyara characters that exist independently of any narrative or individual personality. Narrative and personality, however, are essential features for the more conventional fictional characters, which therefore end up functioning as hypotexts for the kyara: they are reduced to a repertoire from which to plunder to create parodies and unusual combinations (for a detailed discussion of the shift from character to kyara in post-1990s manga, see Itō 2005) . The creation of kyara is therefore a form of bricolage that draws on a database made up of diverse and dynamic code elements. Similar to online browsing, kyara culture does not require a modern grand narrative, paradigm, or unified perspective to guide the choices, readings, and interpretations of its production-consumption in a cohesive fashion. Azuma Hiroki, the most influential theorist of otaku moe, has gone so far as to argue that this kind of "database consumption" is the key existential and epistemological feature of post-modern Japan (Azuma 2009 ).
This type of rhizomatous logic, which is reminiscent of the "cynical formalism" examined by Kitada, is supported by a "romantic" affect which is as intense as it is ambiguous. Moe in its original meaning within male otaku subcultures can be read as a combination of the rorikon (Lolita complex) and bishōjo (beautiful girls) tropes, but is made more complex by the ambivalent overlap of infantilized innocence and adult desire (Galbraith 2009 ). It builds on the stimulation of polymorphic-idealized feelings of protectiveness towards cute characters, presented as infantilized and helpless, combined with attraction towards eroticized girls.
As it became more widespread, however, moe was also appropriated by women, especially by another emerging subculture known as fujoshi (literally "rotten girls"). This is a self-deprecating term in use among teenagers and young women who read and write Boys Love manga and anime (stories about erotic and romantic relationships between male gay men), and in particular a subgenre called yaoi, an acronym for "no climax, no end, no meaning" (yama nashi, ochi nashi, imi nashi) which includes adaptations and parodies of original mainstream works, often without plot and sexually explicit, bordering on pornography. These adaptations are produced and consumed by the millions of prosumers, mostly women, who make up the wide world of dōjinshi, the circuit of amateur manga, novels, and video games. The moe within fujoshi subculture, as in the case of otaku, feeds on a stimulation of polymorphic-idealized protective feelings for cute and defenceless characters, and attraction for eroticized boys. In this case, it is a combination of the subgenre of shotakon (Shōtarō complex) and bishōnen (beautiful boys). An important difference from the heterosexual model of male otaku attraction for cute kyara is that girls' moe is directed towards imaginary homosexual males.
Thanks to its spread within online discussions, fanfiction, and amateur manga, moe has undergone further transformations in the past two decades, and can now be directed towards any inanimate object or abstract concept: operating systems, speech software, war machines, train lines, food, philosophical concepts, the Constitution, and so forth. Anything existing or imaginable has been anthropomorphized as shōjo and shōnen, girl and boy kyara that are both cutified and eroticized.
History and nation-states have not escaped this moefication of everything, and the 2000s saw the birth of a phenomenon known as moe anthropomorphism of nations (moe kuni gijinka).
AXIS POWERS HETALIA: SEXY NATIONS AND NATIONS WHO LOVE
The multimedia platform Axis Powers Hetalia (2006-present) is by far the most representative example of moe personification of nations and history, both for its success on the national and global market, and because it is the product of a strategic intersection between male otaku and female fujoshi subcultures. Hetalia was born in 2006 as a web manga, an amateur online comic in the surreal humour genre published by Himaruya Hidekaz (1985-) on his website Kitayume. It was then published in six print volumes by Gentosha Comics (2008-2013) with a total circulation of over two million copies, and finally transposed into online TV animation and film by Studio Deen. As with any work of manga or anime that reaches a certain level of popularity, Hetalia has given rise to its own specific media mix, which has been multiplied and disseminated through a constellation of different media and merchandising: CDs of the anime soundtracks for individual characters ("character songs"), CDs of audio adaptations ("drama CD"), video games, dedicated purikura camera booths, vending machines with Hetalia soft drinks, model toys, and of course hundreds of stationery items.
The term Hetalia of the title is a combination of the slang neologism hetare (inept, pathetic wimp) and Itaria (Italy), and could be roughly translated as "Loser Italy." The web manga contains a long series of very brief vignettes that describe the international relations between the three countries of the Axis Powers (Italy, Germany, and Japan) and the Allied countries (USA, Britain, France, Russia, China). Over the years, more than forty nations have become personified, almost entirely as a shōnen, pretty but incompetent boys. The setting is that of the First and Second World Wars, but also includes episodes of ancient history and some contemporary geopolitical events.
Of particular interest with regards to moe is the polymorphous configuration of the main characters. Italy is usually personified as a shōnen boy type, but also appears as a more adult and virile version (grandfather Roman Empire) and a chibi Italy version (premodern Italia), a feminized mini-Italy that is threatened by the attentions of the physically more aggressive and masculine chibi Austria (premodern Austria).
Hetalia is a highly successful intersection between the worlds of otaku and fujoshi, something that is particularly unusual in Japan given the clear gender segregation of the cultural industry and youth subcultures. The male author, Himaruya, explained that the creation of the work was inspired by otaku online discussions on the web forum 2channel that revolved around weapons, armies, and nations, from which it emerged that Italy was always the weakest, and therefore the natural "Loser." However, he chose to personify the nations not in the form of cute eroticized girls, as one could expect in the male otaku context, but rather as pretty boys. Interestingly, his success was determined by female online fandom, especially after the appropriation, imitation, and adaptation in the field of dōjinshi, the vast sea of amateur Japanese manga, which ultimately supports the whole Japanese cultural industry.
In the world of female dōjinshi, especially among teenagers and young women, Hetalia emerged between 2009 and 2011 as the most adapted and parodied work, with almost 10,000 different titles, distributed through amateur circuits and at large exhibitions devoted entirely to it ("Hetalia Only Events"), in bookstores in Akihabara and in Ikebukuro's Otome Road to (the centre of fujoshi subcultures) and through countless message boards on the internet. 6 The net was also the vehicle of the manga's extraordinary popularity overseas, thanks to the work of amateur scanlation (online translation of manga) and fansubbing (amateur subti-tling of anime) by non-Japanese fans, which were circulated even before the official translations. Finally, the official English translations, published at the end of 2010, made the first two volumes of Hetalia the bestselling manga on the North American market.
This success may seem surprising considering that Hetalia was from the beginning an amateur work, with no narrative complexity or aesthetic and graphic sophistication. Much of its appeal is based on a combination of comedy and male personification of nations, whose relations are mediated by primordial impulses of attraction and repulsion, with admittedly hilarious effects, and deployed in brief episodes inspired by real events in world history. The Japanese readers of the original manga listed the following key terms as their main objects of interest, in order of preference: 1. Love, 2. Nations, 3. Pleasure, 4. Moe, 5. Laughter. 7 Within the context of dōjinshi, on the other hand, readers, authors, and event organizers mention two main reasons for their attraction to the comic. First, Hetalia and its shōnen characters extended the moe anthropomorphism of nations, so far confined to a male audience of otaku attracted by shōjo personifications, to a female audience. Second, compared to other original works adapted within dōjinshi, the stories and characters in Hetalia are not bound by narrative structure, environment, or psychological characterization. This opens up endless possibilities for adaptation and parody. In other words, it stimulates a more intimate and affective imaginative approach to the readers' favourite nations and pairings of characters.
S EXUALIZING THE "WEST" × "JAPAN"
But what are the fantasies about nations that Hetalia helped spur within amateur dōjinshi? They are typically structured according to the code of sexualized fantasies of yaoi, a pivotal genre in fujoshi subcultures, which was only hinted at in the original version but becomes central in the adaptations. The main dynamic of romantic and sexual relationships in yaoi is declined according to the grammar of so-called seme and uke. While the seme (literally the one who penetrates or attacks) is the dominant character and is characterized as active, stronger, and more masculine, the uke (literally the one who receives) is more submissive, passive, and feminine (Hori 2009 ).
The most parodied character is Japan (Nihon in the original, Honda Kiku in the parodies), portrayed as a shōnen but feminized as uke in a plethora of different forms, from the most childish, to versions that are merely kawaii, to more sexualized ones, bordering on paedophilia, and more adult androgynous ones. The most popular seme partners he is paired with in dōjinshi fairs dedicated specifically to the character of Nihon are all Caucasians characters representing the "white" nations of Euro-America; in order of preference, England, the USA, France, Prussia, Italy, and Russia (StadioYou 2010a, p. 1). The most commonly recurring pairings at other fairs are America (seme)/England (uke), England (seme)/Japan (uke), France (seme)/England (uke), and Germany (seme)/ Italy (uke) (StadioYou 2010b: 1, 8) .
The imagined geography underlying these inter-national couplings in dōjinshi are already explicitly represented in the original Hetalia-printed manga volumes, including world maps based on Eurocentric cartography (Himaruya 2010: 10-11) . Besides Japan, almost all the main characters in the original manga and anime versions are cute and attractive white male Caucasians: Axis Powers Italy and Germany, together with Allied forces USA, England, France, Russia, and the "Five Nordic Nations" (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark). Most of the episodes are inspired by events that occurred between First and Second World Wars, and centre on intimate quarrels between European characters, the American character, and Japan. If we consider Japan's international relations in this period, we find that most of the real historical and military events actually involved very dramatic and tragic contacts between Imperial Japan and its Asian neighbours. However, the series only includes a few Asian characters, of which the most important is China, with some independent episodes centring on the character of Korea in the web manga, while Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam appear mainly as sketch characters in Himaruya's webpage and blog.
In addition to the textual and visual level, the modern cultural history of national identity as regards "Japan" versus the "West" is confirmed by readers' preference for white Caucasian characters. A poll carried out by Hetalia publisher Gentōsha on readers' most loved characters looks like a kind of gaijin akogare (fascination for western foreigners) ranking. In fact, the nineteen most popular characters after top-ranking Japan are England, Germany, Russia, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Greece, USA, Sweden, with China as the only character from the 'Rest' of the world voted in 17th place. according to the BL or yaoi code of male-to-male seme/uke pairings. The most popular is the America (seme)/England (uke) pairing, followed by the England (seme)/Japan (uke) pairing, the Prussia (uke) corner, the France (seme)/England (uke) pairing, and the Scandinavian characters corner (StadioYou 2010b: 8) . Japan is not only the most popular character among general readers of the original, but also very popular as a completely feminized or infantilized male uke character on the dōjinshi scene. Exhibition layouts of Hetalia conventions centred exclusively on Japan as a uke character show that the most popular seme partners are all white Caucasians: first England, followed by the USA, France, Prussia, Italy, and Russia (StadioYou 2010a: 1).
I suggest that the internalization of a Eurocentric history and cartography plays a prominent role in the popularity of Hetalia not only in Japan, but also worldwide, especially in Euro-American contexts. Eurocentrism and whiteness contribute to the immediate familiarity and direct appropriation of the Hetalia world and characters by Euro-American readers, without any need for complex mediation imposed by displacing difference or otherness. This familiarity is further enhanced by the specific stereotyping of characters according to modern clichés of the so-called national characters, adopted by the author Himaruya in response to the ethnic jokes common among his American friends when he was studying in New York. For instance, Japan is shy, well mannered, loves the changes of seasons and technological gadgets, but is clumsy in communicating his feelings and thoughts. On the contrary, Italy is a light-hearted, idler, and pizza-pasta-music-loving coward. America is an energetic, self-confident, always hamburger-eating character who loves to play hero, but is superstitious and afraid of supernatural beings. 9 In addition to its wider Eurocentric cartography and fascination for whiteness, it is also important to pay attention to more positionally specific differences introduced by Hetalia's recontextualization of Occidentalism, and to acknowledge other intersections related to more ambivalent spheres of identification and nuanced modes of appropriation. According to the aforementioned Gentōsha survey, "nation" is the second most appreciated aspect among general readers.
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Nations are anthropomorphized as shōnen (cute boys) characters, and, in the absence of a supporting narrative and graphic sophistication, are condensed as the exclusive focus of the short episodes. This means that, on the one hand, Eurocentrism, whiteness, history, and geopolitical asymmetry are clarified and essentialized, considering the wide use of stereotypes related to nation, ethnicity, and language, and that characters, at least in the original, are only known by nation names ("Japan," "Italy," "Germany," etc.).
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Entire nations are personified through a unified human body, personality, and name, contributing to the erasure of internal diversities and historical complexities. For instance, Occidentalism is enhanced by personifying USA, Russia, or Germany as strong, blond-haired, active characters, while self-Orientalism is reaffirmed by Japan as a shy, passive, insecure, and feminized boy or kid.
At the same time, it is the very anthropomorphic and caricaturized incarnation of modern nationhood, as seen in the insistence upon childish and intimate male-to-male relations, that introduces a fundamental ironic slippage to conventional images of world history, international relations, and national politics. This contributes to exhilarating effects, and stimulates a polymorphous range of symbolic associations and emotions, both of which have been crucial in mobilizing such widespread readings of the original manga and so many parodies among amateur prosumers.
D OUBLE PARODY OF THE "WEST"
As far as the pleasure of parodying Hetalia is concerned, it is important to stress that the original is not a mere personification of Euro-American nations or of Japan, but already a parody of them: a pastiche, which may oscillate between an homage to Eurocentric history and fascination for whiteness, and a mocking caricature of their national stereotypes and their infantile behaviour. In this regard, Occidentalism functions in the original as a kind of discursive hypotext. The hegemonic grand narrative, so familiar in both Euro-American and Japanese contexts, is transfigured by resorting to an effective bricolage of highly popular icons, borrowed strategically by both male-oriented otaku and female-oriented fujoshi subcultures. 12 Boys Love and yaoi fantasies, on the other hand, are dominant in dōjinshi works, displaying in many cases a male homoerotic and very sexually explicit, often pornographic version of Occidentalism. Anthropomorphized Eurocentrism and geopolitical hierarchy may be further enhanced due to the yaoi code of seme and uke, focusing on a far more restricted relation and narrative than in the original. This makes the hierarchic and dualistic dialectic of identity and otherness imposed upon historical relations between nations even more evident. As Nagaike Kazumi has highlighted in her study on the racialized tex- tuality of Boys Love magazines, this hierarchic dialectic emerges in the "masculine" superiorization of the Euro-American other as seme, the "feminine" inferiorization of the Japanese self as uke, and the exotic Orientalization or erasure of the "Rest" of the world (Nagaike 2009 ).
However, unlike commercial Boys Love works, these dōjinshi are amateur works, parodies of the original Hetalia. If Himaruya's work is already itself a parody of the hegemonic hypotext of Occidentalism, then these dōjinshi are a parody of a parody. Due to the different positionality of the mostly female dōijinshi authors living in Japan, the discursive distance concerning Occidentalism as well as Euro-American material referentiality is therefore further enhanced and diluted. When Himaruya composed Hetalia, he was living in New York, and he was mostly inspired by Euro-American friends and students in modelling his manga characters. Dōjinshi authors, on the other hand, live in Japan, and their recontextualization is shaped both by different gendered positions and by referentiality to different people, and to different material, social, and institutional conditions. According to my interviews, dōjinshi authors and readers are actually not very fond of Euro-American history and nations, whiteness, the original work and its author, or male homosexuality. That is, Hetalia authors and cosplayers are not necessarily interested in foreign countries or concrete persons per se. Most of them have never been to Europe or North America, have never met a Caucasian boy or man, and do not necessarily express interest in doing so. Instead, they focus on how to use these settings and icons according to the visual grammar and established conventions of the Boys Love and yaoi genres in order to share and enjoy them with other fans. Much time may be invested in studying the preferred nation character's history, language, customs, dress, food, and architecture, all in the most minute detail. This includes bibliographic research, online or in libraries, and in some cases even short trips to European cities, which may become on their return the setting for their own dōjinshi adaptation. Interestingly, this acquired knowledge can also be used to legitimate what might be perceived as an embarrassing hobby. What matters to these fans are the specific and concrete needs of a teenager or young woman in relation to the gendered and sexualized norms informing external relations with other teenagers, men, and adults, as well as their internal relations with the dōjinshi or Hetalia fandom. 13 I must specify here that not all female dōjinshi fall within the genres of "pornographic" (for 18+ readers) and "sex" (for 15+ readers), although in the case of the adaptations Hetalia those are prevalent. What they all have in common however is the grammar of yaoi "sexualised parody." The text must be a parody, which requires the existence of an original or hypotext in which the characters are male (in this case the original manga by Himaruya); and sexualized, because the adaptation is done according to a more or less eroticized cross-gender logic, mostly male gay, sometimes queer or paedophile, in many cases just hinted at, in others explicit and highly detailed.
CONCLUSIONS: JAPAN AND "POST"-JAPAN
Returning to the initial question, what can Hetalia and its extraordinary success in the field of women's subcultures reveal about the relationship between national identity, history, and young people? As with any multimedia platform, that cannot be reduced to a single work and reception, it would be misguided to attempt a single unified interpretation. This is even more true for the media mix started by Hetalia, which, together with its reverberation in the amateur sphere, was able in a few years to generate a wide range of diverse and conflicting reactions.
On the one hand, the Japanese fandom has tried to limit its consumption within the tested channels of hobbified, private intimacy, typical of the female dōjinshi circuit. On the other hand, its online visibility has inadvertently exposed the world of Hetalia to a series of reactions, including those of the indignant male netizens of South Korea who objected to the stereotypical representation of the character Korea. This led in 2009 to a petition to Parliament to stop (successfully) the announced television broadcasting of the anime version of Hetalia, on grounds of "criminal discrimination" against the Korean people. 14 Such unexpected public resonance, amplified by the national and international media, further contributed to the spread of the manga in the international manga and anime fandom community, originating new accusations from within the fandom, especially against its superficial discussion of world history and its appropriation of serious history in the mode of yaoi, finally mobilizing the attention of scholars and academics.
It would be easy to conclude with a relativist view, intent on legitimizing any single interpretation as attributable to specific locations, often irreconcilable: Japanese fangirl, anti-Japanese Asian, post-feminist or post-modern academic, international fandom, and so on. There is no doubt however that Hetalia exemplifies a new phase of the "cynical romanticism" theorized by Kitada as the cypher of contemporary Japanese youth nationalism. The modern paradigms of "White West," "Nation," "History," but also those of "love" and "(hetero) sexual couple" continue to provide essential reference points for identity formation, although as transfigured surrogates. They are not, however, as Kitada rightly suggests, only empty and formal simulacra, but representations and practices that require, and induce, a high level of emotional investment. In the case of Hetalia, these translate into an idea of nation and history that is further dispersed in the already globalized Japanese media mix, and, at the same time, becomes even more intense and passionate because of the mobilization of moe biopolitics that is able to activate the most intimate aspects of parodic, polymorphous, and eroticized pleasure.
In conclusion, lest we overstate the impact of Hetalia, we must remember that it is a subcultural phenomenon; both the original versions and the thousands of adaptations are essentially parodies of modern ideas of Nation and History that are still very present in the institutional arena. However, the parodies are characterized by an ambivalent status, a paradoxical double bind with their hypotextual original that sees them engage in both repetitive confirmation and subversive critique. And this concerns youth subcultures all over the world in their attempt to relate to their past and present societies:
As the postwar finally "ends", the task in Japan and elsewhere is therefore to reconceive the modern, which is less an idea than an episteme, less a concept than a condition […] . We all seem to suffer from a kind of conceptual insufficiency, in that we are facing the twenty-first century armed with the notions of the nineteenth. We are still moderns, which explain our obsession with "ends" and the caesura of 1989, but ours is a "nontopia": we are without a vision of the future. The millennial challenge therefore is less a question of ends or of overcoming the modern than to avoid being overcome by the modern and drifting visionless into the next millennium. And this problem is not Japan's alone, but all of ours (Gluck 2003: 312) fans. For a public, collective, and joyous performance, see the Hetalia Cosplay Group at Rimini Comics 2010 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-fLtXG98T4). 14. The news can be seen online at www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo_btds9-kM.
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